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We live in an “age of melancholy” (1). Our children succumb to depression at progressively younger ages and at progres­
sively higher rates. Scientific inquiry over the last two decades has identi­
fied several cognitive and behavioral deficits implicated in the etiology of 
childhood depression and, of these, pessimistic explanatory style is per­
haps the most researched. Within the last decade a handful of researchers 
have begun work on empirical validation of protocols designed to redress 
faulty thinking in depressed children.
This chapter examines a depression prevention program for children 
developed at the University of Pennsylvania. In this chapter we focus on 
two related cognitive-behavioral risk factors for depression in children; 
learned helplessness and pessimistic explanatory style. First, we briefly 
profile childhood depression. Second, we outline the nature of learned 
helplessness and pessimism in children. Third, we offer two conceptuali­
zations of learned optimism. Narrowly defined, learned optimism is the 
skill of reattributing one’s pessimistic explanations to more optimistic 
causes. More broadly formulated, it is a set of skills that promotes cognitive 
flexibility and resiliency in children. Within this framework we describe 
our program, the Penn Optimism Program, which aims to “inoculate” chil­
dren against depression with the skills of learned optimism.
Childhood Depression
The lifetime prevalence of major depression in the United States has in­
creased dramatically in the last two generations (2). This is in part due to 
decreases in the mean age of onset observed over the same time period (3).
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Current estimates indicate that almost 10% of children experience clinical 
depression before the age of 14, and up to 20% of adolescents have a major 
depressive episode before the end of their high school years (4, 5).
In spite of sound epidemiological evidence indicating increased risk for 
children, the development and validation of effective treatments for child 
and adolescent depression have lagged behind the adult research. Two his­
torical factors have contributed to this. Only recently have clinicians and 
researchers acknowledged that children can be clinically depressed (6), and 
that child depression is phenomenologically similar to the adult disorder 
(7). Furthermore, prior to the 1970s, the existing psychotherapeutic inter­
ventions for adult depression were predominately psychoanalytic in ori­
entation. These therapies were considered inappropriate for children and 
young adolescents, who, it was argued, were yet to complete their psy- 
chosexual development.
The advent of cognitive therapy for depression paved the way for new 
treatments of childhood depression (8,9). Three lines of research converged 
to indicate that cognitive techniques were germane to the treatment of de­
pression in children. First, cognitive therapies are demonstrably effective 
in treating adult depression (10). Second, as proposed by cognitive theo­
rists, the efficacy of the therapy is mediated by change in the patient’s mal­
adaptive thoughts (11). Third, depressive children tend to mcike the same 
cognitive distortions associated with the adult disorder, and these mala­
daptive styles of thinking have been causally implicated in the develop­
ment of depression in children and adolescents (12-15). Specifically, chil­
dren whose thinking style is pessimistic are significantly more likely to fail 
and become depressed than their optimistic peers.
Helplessness and Pessimism
A hallmark feature of depression is the individual’s perceived lack of con­
trol over her world and her future; a sense of helplessness that leads to 
hopelessness (16). A seminal animal model of uncontrollability was devel­
oped in the 1960s by Martin Seligman and his colleagues (17,18). As grad­
uate students in an animal learning laboratory, they conducted a series of 
trials in which dogs in two experimental conditions were administered 
noninjurious electric shocks. Dogs in the first condition were able to turn 
off the shock with a simple lever push. The animals in the second condition 
were unable to escape the shocks. They were experimentally “yoked” with 
those in the first condition to ensure equivalent amounts of electric shock 
across condition, but they had no lever and no control.
Some twenty-four hours later, all of the dogs were put through a second 
learning paradigm. They were placed in a shuttlebox—a small box divided 
in two by a low barrier. When the floor of one side of the box was electrified, 
the dogs in the lever condition learned, within two or three trials, to escape 
across the barrier. The dogs who had no control in the first experiment
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never attempted escape. They overgeneralized learning from a situation in 
which they clearly did not have control, to one in which they truly did. 
They had learned to he helpless.
The “learned helplessness” model was readily extended to human be­
havior. When people are subjected to uncontrollable noise, for example, 
fully two-thirds fail to switch off highly preventable noise in a subsequent 
phase of the experiment (19). However, not everyone becomes helpless in 
the wake of an uncontrollable, aversive event. Revision of the theory was 
required to account for the resilient third. The reformulated model inte­
grated helplessness with the cognitive variable of explanatory style (20). By 
so doing, learned helplessness was modified from a theory of stimulus- 
operant-response to one of stimulus-interpretation-response.
We are predisposed to analyze and interpret the events that befall us in 
life (21). We attribute them to cause, and we imbue them with meaning for 
ourselves and our future. This seems particularly true of negative events, 
perhaps because the threats they pose are more salient to survival than the 
boon provided by positive events. And it is as true of preadolescent chil­
dren as it is of adults. When a child argues with a school friend, to what 
does she attribute the disagreement? Does she put it down to the recent 
divorce of her friend’s parents, or does she instead believe “my friend’s a 
jerk”? Does she think “all friendships have their ups and dovras,” or does 
she say to herself “I’m just no good with people?”
If we analyze these very different explanations, we see they vary across 
three dimensions. First, some will believe that the argument is all their fault 
(“I’m so irritable”; internal), while others attribute it to the friend or to 
circumstances (“she’s a jerk” or “she’s upset over her parents’ divorce”; 
external). Second, some will attribute the argument to an enduring cause 
(“I don’t have what it takes to be a good friend”; stable), while others will 
see the cause as short-lived (“all friendships go through ups and downs”; 
unstable). Third, some believe that the cause of the argument undermines 
almost everything they do (“I’m just not good with people”; global), while 
others will confine the operation of that cause to a relatively narrow domain 
(“I don’t deal well with people as upset as she”; specific). Pessimists tend 
to explain negative events in terms of internal, stable, and global causes, 
and attribute positive events to external, unstable, and specific causes. Con­
versely, optimists tend to explain negative events as due to external, unsta­
ble, and specific causes, while ascribing positive outcomes to internal, sta­
ble, and global attributes.
In the reformulation, emphasis shifted from uncontrollable aversive 
events to the perceived uncontrollability of aversive events. Perception of 
control is mapped onto the three dimensions of explanatory style. One’s 
own behavior is generally more amenable to control than that of another. 
Given that we want adversity to end and will exert whatever control we 
have to end it, those negative events perceived as uncontrollable will also 
be seen as stable over time. So, internal and unstable attributions typically 
denote high levels of controllability. For example, imagine your child ex-
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plains the argument with her friend in the following way: “we argued be­
cause I was cranky, and I was cranky because I stayed up too late watching 
TV last night.” It should be relatively easy for the child to change her TV 
viewing so that crankiness rarely interferes in her social world again. 
External-stable explanations indicate low controllability, because to gain 
control over them one must effect another’s disposition or an environmen­
tal constant (e.g., stop the friend from being a jerk, or cause her parents to 
reconcile). Attributions to internal-stable or external-unstable causes usu­
ally represent a middle level of control (e.g., “I’m not good with sad peo­
ple,” “she’s in a bad mood”). Global attributions indicate loss of control— 
that the cause of the problem cannot be contained. In essence, the more 
pessimistic the attribution, the less the degree of perceived control.
Optimism and pessimism are best conceptualized as poles on a contin­
uum. We tend to reflexively explain negative events at a habitual level of 
pessimism, which can be measured with a quick and easy pencil and paper 
test (22). Furthermore, in the absence of active intervention, our degree of 
pessimism remains constant across the lifespan (23). For these reasons our 
degree of optimism-pessimism is referred to as an “explanatory style.” The 
adult literature demonstrates that pessimists are at elevated risk for com­
promised performance in sports (24), reduced productivity in the work­
place (25), academic failure (26), depressed mood (27), and even death from 
coronary heart disease (28).
Pessimism in children is measured using the Children’s Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (CASQ), developed for ages 8 to 14 (29). The CASQ 
consists of 48 forced-choice items, in which the child is presented with a 
hypothetical positive or negative event and asked to choose between two 
possible causes. On each item, two of the dimensions are held constant 
across the two explanations and the third is varied. For example, respon­
dents are presented with “a good friend tells yon that he hates you” and 
must choose between “my friend was in a bad mood that day” and “I wasn’t 
nice to my friend that day.” These attributions are both relatively unstable 
and specific, bnt the former is external and the latter internal. Sixteen items 
are designed to tap each of the three dimensions. Internal, stable, and global 
scores for each of the positive and negative hypothetical events can be com­
bined into composite positive and composite negative scores (CP and CN). 
A summary optimism score (CPCN) is derived by subtracting CN from CP. 
Internal consistency and test-retest reliability is best with these three com­
posites (30).
Examination of explanatory style in children began in earnest as recently 
as the mid 1980s. Research since indicates that children’s causal attribu­
tions, especially those for negative events, stabilize into a style by about 
age nine (31) and that, as with adults, pessimism leads to an array of age­
relevant problems. Pessimism causes depressive symptoms in children 
(30). The pessimistic child tends to nnderachieve academically (32, 33) and 
has fewer and less satisfying peer relationships (34).
LEARNED OPTIMISM IN CHILDREN 169
Can the maladaptive consequences of pessimism be averted? Is explan­
atory style changeable? Cognitive therapy does produce positive change in 
explanatory style. This appears not to be true of drug therapies, even when 
the degree of depressive symptom relief is comparable. Furthermore, 
change in explanatory style is an important mediator of both treatment and 
relapse prevention effects (35). That is, those depressed patients who be­
come more optimistic over the course of cognitive therapy not only benefit 
more from the therapy, but are also more robust against subsequent bouts 
of depression.
The Penn Optimism Program (POP) attempts to equip at-risk children 
with these same skills.
Challenging Pessimism
The Penn Optimism Program (POP)
The Penn Optimism Program (POP) is a 12-week (24-hour), school-based 
intervention which is delivered in groups of 10 to 12 children. In our initial 
iterations of POP, participants were not diagnosably depressed, but were at 
risk for depression due to high levels of family conflict, low levels of family 
cohesion, or the early onset of mild levels of depressive symptomatology. 
In POP we have attempted to distill the essential skills of cognitive therapy, 
calibrate them to a child’s developmental age, and present them in a pre­
ventive mode. The result is a manualized, activities-based curriculum 
which reads much more like a school course than a therapy.
Reference to an “optimism program” may invoke notions of a protocol 
designed purely to make pessimists more optimistic; a “reattribution train­
ing,” as it is often labeled. Reattribution is an important skill to which 
substantial content is devoted in POP. But relegating optimism to change 
in causal explanations is optimism narrowly defined (36). The causal attri­
butions we make are rich in context and meaning. They reflect our past 
successes and failures. They are snapshots of our current cognitive biases. 
And they entail predictions about our futures. When a child concludes that 
she failed a history test because she “didn’t study enough,” she is implicitly 
adding that in the future she can avoid academic failure by studying more. 
Conversely, when she attributes to a pessimistic cause like “I’m just plain 
stupid,” she endows her academic future with hopelessness.
In addition, causal explanations frame the problems in our lives and 
therefore also determine the goals we set and the solutions we generate. 
Some children in interpersonal settings seem particularly prone to biased 
attributions and consequently to poor social problem solving. Accurate pre­
dictions and effective problem solving are skills which we include as 
learned optimism, broadly defined.
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Causal Reattribution: Flexibility and Accuracy
In POP, the skill of reattribution is set within the framework of Albert Ellis’s 
ABC model (37, 38). Ellis argued that we intuitively believe that activating 
events lead to emotional and behavioral consequences (A^C, e.g., fail a 
history test and so give up and become depressed), but that this intuition 
is wrong because it omits a crucial mediating variable. According to Ellis, 
activating events invoke certain beliefs in us, and it is these beliefs that 
make sense of how we feel and what we do (i.e., A—>B-^C). Beck and col­
leagues focus on automatic thoughts; those beliefs that occur reflexively in 
the wake of negative events (9, 39, 40). Attributions represent an important 
subset of automatic thoughts.
The first three sessions of POP teach the skill of causal reattribution. But 
more fundamentally these sessions try to convey to the participant the no­
tions of cognitive flexibility and accuracy.
Sessions 1 and 2 are devoted to developing flexibility. Adults and even 
children get themselves into explanatory ruts. Their explanations for neg­
ative events form rapidly and reflexively and exist on the periphery of 
awareness. Therefore, we must first teach the children to slow down their 
thinking in order to identify their automatic attributions. Second, we guide 
them to an understanding of the emotional and behavioral impact of these 
thoughts, as predicted by the ABC model. We describe this to our students 
as the link between thoughts and feelings and present it in the form of three- 
panel cartoons like that in Figure 8.1.
POP participants learn how to recognize pessimistic and optimistic 
thoughts and to analyze them according to the three dimensions of explan-
Figure 8.1. Illustration of the ABC model using a three-panel cartoon.
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atory style. With the aid of role-plays and stories, they learn about the mech­
anism of self-fulfilling prophecy, by which pessimistic thoughts lead to 
depression and failure while optimistic thoughts do not. When Greg, a pes­
simist, is turned down at the school dance, for example, he thinks: “I got 
rejected because I’m ugly and nobody likes me.” The emotional conse­
quence of this thought is that Greg feels sad. The behavioral consequence 
is that he clings to the wall for the rest of the evening. By taking himself 
off the dance floor, he ensures that he does not get to dance. This only serves 
to corroborate his initial belief, rendering it even less likely that he dances 
at the next event. Linking back to helplessness and explanatory style, Greg’s 
attribution of the event to highly internal, stable, and global causes leads 
him to quit and to fail to exert control over elements of the situation which 
are in fact changeable.
Most important, however, we encourage the students to generate alter­
native causal attributions; explanations outside of their typically narrow 
band of optimism-pessimism. We ask them to be as creative as possible, 
without vetting their responses, and we help them trace the very different 
consequences they would experience were they to endorse the alternative 
attribution. Imagine if Greg were to respond with a more external, unstable, 
or specific response, such as “she must not feel like dancing,” or even “that 
girl probably doesn’t like me.” What are the alternative emotional and be­
havioral consequences for him? He will probably experience some sadness, 
but significantly less than the thought “I’m ugly” will generate in a 12-year- 
old child. His more optimistic thoughts make it rational for him to persist, 
and his persistence will, in all likelihood, lead him to a dance partner {see 
Figure 8.2). This newfound cognitive flexibility continues as a central 
theme in POP, applied not only to causal attributions, but also to predic­
tions about the future and the search for goal-compatible problem-solving 
strategies.
While Sessions 1 and 2 promote the expansion of the children’s attribu- 
tional repertoire. Session 3 is devoted to funneling down to accuracy. The 
lay notion of optimism is one of resolutely refusing to see bad events as bad. 
This is encapsulated in facile phrases like “turning grey skies into blue,” 
“looking at the world through rose-colored glasses,” or “seeing the glass as 
half-full.” Even some clinicians and researchers have communicated to us 
their belief that reattribution is the process of shaping optimistic explana­
tions, regardless of the evidence. This, however, has never been our under­
standing of that skill. Rather for us, reattribution is the practice of supplant­
ing pessimism with optimism only “to the extent that reality permits” (36).
In POP, the skills of generating alternatives (cognitive flexibility) and 
evaluating the evidence for and against each is paralleled with the work of 
a detective. Endorsing one’s initial attribution without considering other 
possible causes is analogous to arresting the first suspect. Glibly reattribut­
ing to a more optimistic cause is equally irrational.
Problems in life almost never have a single cause. Rather, they are a 
consequence of a multiplicity of contributing factors. So, in analyzing the
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Figure 8.2. Demonstrating reattribution with the three-panel cartoon.
cause of a problem, a good detective first lists several candidates. In re­
sponse to asking herself why she failed the history exam, she not only ar­
rives at the explanation “I’m just plain stupid,” but also lists “I didn’t put 
in enough hours of study,” “I didn’t study the right material in the right 
way,” “the teacher has it in for me,” and “I’m just not good at history” to 
name a few.
POP participants are taught how to review their lives and solicit infor­
mation from others to help in evaluating the accuracy of each causal self­
statement. Older children are assisted in determining the relative contri­
bution of each cause that has implications for problem solving. Devoting 
more time to study for the next exam is only beneficial if the child also 
studies the right material in the right way. Similarly, coaxing her parents 
to meet with the principal about the teacher’s animosity will not help if the 
exam failure is due to inadequate study. You cannot solve a problem until 
you know what the problem is.
Some children are habitually more optimistic than the evidence war­
rants. This typically manifests itself on the internal-external dimension. In 
the wake of an exam failure, they may automatically assume it’s because 
“tbe teacher hates me.” We encourage these children to generate and eval­
uate more internal attributions in order to take responsibility for what they 
are truly culpable. Their overly optimistic response may preserve their self­
esteem and mood, but it is not reality-based and so does not lend itself to 
effective solutions. Our task with children who habitually externalize 
blame is to guide them to greater dexterity in generating more pessimistic
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attributions. However, the children in our programs more often show a 
depressogenic attributional style. When these children become more ac­
curate in their causal explanations, they are moving toward the optimistic 
end of the continuum.
Determining a problem-solving strategy is also a logical funneling pro­
cess. Focal causes are delineated from the candidate list on the basis of the 
evidence implicating them in the problem. Once isolated, their changea­
bility can be examined. Highly stable factors are less amenable to change 
(e.g., “I’m just not all that smart”). Although such a cause may play a large 
role, it is maladaptive to allocate limited problem-solving resources to its 
resolution. If unstable factors (e.g., study habits) contribute at all, then some 
scope for improvement is afforded the student. Study habits can be moni­
tored and alterations made and tested against subsequent exams. If the child 
truly adheres to the new study regimen hut still no change is evident, then 
different causes should be examined and new solutions sought and tested. 
Eventually the weight of the evidence may indeed indicate that the student 
truly is just not cut out to be a historian. In spite of all her efforts to improve 
in the course, the student may have reached asymptote on grade or aca­
demic interest. Perhaps then a cost-henefit analysis may point toward real­
locating her study time and energy to different subjects. If asymptote is 
reached across her academic life, then she should be encouraged to explore 
nonacademic talents and interests, while studying enough to maintain the 
best grades she cem. Her depressogenic or anxiety-invoking beliefs about 
her future (e.g., “I’ll never amount to anything”) can he subjected to the 
same scrutiny, as described in the next section.
It is in this way that learned optimism plays out in problem solving. The 
optimistic child is not Pollyanna. When problems arise, she seeks out those 
causes which are most implicated and most changeable. The pessimist be­
comes helpless because he automatically settles on a unitary stable and 
global cause and so can find no leverage for change. The optimist remains 
resilient because her cognitive skills lead her to find and exert control 
whenever and wherever possible, but always “to the degree that reality 
permits” (36).
Applying the Skills to Predictions
Depression and anxiety are highly comorbid in both adults and children 
(41). The same cognitive errors and distortions which produce depression 
when applied to past events may lead to anxiety when operating on possible 
futures. Indeed, as we saw earlier, causal attributions are imbued with pre­
dictions about the future.
Some of the children in our program are experiencing high levels of 
parental conflict at home. The pessimists among them report that when 
their parents argue, or even fight, they have a stream of thoughts like the 
following:
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What did I do wrong this time? I know they’re fighting because of me. 
What’s wrong with me? I’m always messing up. They get angry with 
me and they fight with each other. They’re always arguing and they 
always will. They’ll probably get divorced like Mike’s parents. My 
mom will be so unhappy. She’ll never get over it. My dad will move 
away and I’ll never see him again. I’ll never be happy again.
Her causal attribution is highly pessimistic. She not only blames herself 
(“I did something wrong”), she also assigns the cause to what seems like a 
highly stable, dispositional aspect of herself (something is “wrong with 
me”). When we make predictions about the future, it is rational to take 
current circumstances into account. Because she attributes the fighting to 
stable causes, she necessarily projects into a bleak future. “My parents will 
get divorced because they don’t care about me, and they don’t care about 
me because there is something wrong with me.” If one assumes the cause 
of the fighting is permanent, one must also assume that the fighting will 
continue.
Her attribution to cause is probably inaccurate. Parents often fight about 
the child, but they rarely fight because of the child. However, disputing 
this single attribution may not be sufficient to significantly reduce her hope­
lessness. Her negative view of the future is probably supported by an entire 
network of pessimistic beliefs which feed into her predictions. “My mother 
will never be happy again because I just don’t have what it takes to help 
her.” “My father will leave forever because he doesn’t care about me, and 
he doesn’t care about me because I just can’t connect with anyone.” “I’ll 
never be happy again because bad things make me sad, and I have no con­
trol over my mood nor the events in my life.” These are causal attributions 
for projected future events.
If we scrutinize her self-statements about the future, we notice that 
whenever there is ambiguity, her pessimism leads her to predict the worst. 
She has offered up an implicit causal chain:
parents’ fighting —> divorce —> absent father
She perceives a 1:1 correspondence between each step in the chain; 
fighting will lead to divorce, and divorce means that she will rarely or never 
see her father again. This process is called “catastrophizing” (see chapter 
12 in this volume). While her predicted outcome is possible, it is unlikely. 
First, most married couples argue but most do not divorce. Second, within 
those 45% of marriages that do end in divorce, in most cases the children 
do have access to both parents.
The process of disputing such catastrophic beliefs is called “decatastro- 
phizing.” In this skill, the children are asked to again use their cognitive 
flexibility, this time in generating several possible futures as alternatives to 
the pessimism-driven outlook they automatically conceived. Flexibility can
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be maximized by providing a structure within which the child generates 
alternatives. We first ask the child to generate and list the worst possible 
outcomes for the current situation. For the pessimists, these are the very 
thoughts over which they habitually ruminate. Next, we prompt for some 
best possible outcomes, with the caveat that they must he about as improb­
able as the worst list (e.g., “I’ll never be happy again” can be counterpoised 
with “they will never argue again”). Finally, the child generates most likely 
outcomes. By extracting the worst-case scenarios the child feels validated. 
Without generating best-case outcomes children may fail to see the low 
probability of their worst fears. Worst and best lists serve to calibrate their 
evaluation using evidence.
The worst, best, and most likely lists can be used to inform problem­
solving strategy. Most time and energy should be devoted to the outcomes 
in the most likely list. Strategies can be implemented now to minimize the 
chances that bad outcomes occur and maximize any positive outcomes. 
However, one or two of the worst-case scenarios may be so maladaptive 
that some time should be devoted to averting those consequences.
The child who makes pessimistic attributions for past events also pro­
jects her pessimism into the future. Like a bad detective, she assumes her 
most catastrophic thoughts will inevitably be realized, and this perception 
leads to helplessness in the present. The optimistic child recognizes that 
predicted futures are testable hypotheses that can be evaluated by evidence. 
How much do other parents argue? Of her friends whose parents have di­
vorced, how many have access to both parents and how many are never 
happy again? They use this information to reshape their predictions, iden­
tify the most likely, and act to exert control where they can.
Applying the Skills to the Social World
We have outlined and demonstrated the use of learned optimism skills with 
causal attributions and with catastrophic predictions. There are indications 
that for some children, negative social interactions evoke a particular style 
of attributional bias, to which the skills of learned optimism can be suc­
cessfully applied. In this section we examine attributions in the social do­
main.
Research within the last decade has identified five information-pro- 
cessing steps required for competent social interaction (42). For a child to 
respond appropriately to the behavior of a peer, she must first attend to and 
encode the verbal and nonverbal cues displayed by the peer. Second, she 
must use those cues to accurately interpret the peer’s motivation for be­
having as he did. Third, she must generate an array of possible responses, 
evaluate the consequences of enacting each, and then, fourth, select the 
most appropriate. Fifth, she must successfully enact the selected behavioral 
response.
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Peer-rejected and aggressive children commonly show deficits at one or 
more of these stages (43). For example, visualize the melee that can be the 
middle school playground. Imagine a child who finds himself face down 
on the ground without knowing how he got there. Was he pushed or acci­
dentally bumped, and by whom? Some children in negative interpersonal 
situations such as these tend to assume that the other’s intentions were 
malevolent, and they selectively attend to cues that support that assump­
tion. This hostile attributional bias often leads them to select and enact 
aggressive responses. From the perspective of their peer who truly meant 
no malice, this aggressive response seems unprovoked, and so they tend to 
respond in kind. The true level of hostility is embellished through the dis­
torted lens of the child’s hostile attributional bias—and so the cycle of ag­
gression continues.
POP attempts to build skills at all five stages of the social-cognitive pro­
cess. Children are taught basic behavioral skills to delay their initial im­
pulse to act. Instead, they learn to identify and distance themselves from 
their automatic hostile attribution. Like a good detective, they draw up a 
list of suspects (generate alternatives), and look for clues (evaluate evi­
dence) to determine the relative contribution of the candidate causes they 
have generated. They learn how to view the situation from another’s per­
spective, the better to determine the true motivation of the playground in­
stigator. The children use decision-making sldlls acquired in an earlier ses­
sion to choose the most appropriate course of action, and learn strategies 
to help enact that option (e.g., assertiveness).
Depressed children are more likely to make hostile attributions than 
their nondepressed peers (44). When faced with an aversive social situa­
tion, the pessimist will invoke a self-fulfilling prophecy an interactive 
aggression spiral that brings upon himself the very behavior against which 
he is so vigilant. The optimistic child has learned to see the world more 
accurately and so is primed to choose a more prosocial course of action.
Empirical Evaluation of POP
POP is predicated on the skills of learned optimism outlined above. These 
are complemented with lessons on assertiveness, negotiation, relaxation 
techniques, anger, and sadness control, dealing with procrastination, social 
skills, and decision making. The 12-session protocol is fully scripted and 
manualized (45).
The first empirical trial of POP was conducted with fifth- and sixth-grade 
children in two middle schools in the suburbs of Philadelphia (46,47) (de­
sign and methodology is fully described in Jaycox, Reivich, Gillham, & Se- 
ligman, 1994). The children selected for the program were at risk for 
depression based on their self-report of depressive symptomatology and 
their perception of parental conflict in the home. Both prevention and con­
trol condition children completed the Children s Depression Inventory
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(GDI) (48) and the CASQ at six measurement points; pre, post, and every 
six months for two years.
POP children experienced significantly fewer depressive symptoms than 
their control peers at every measurement point from post-test through the 
two-year follow-up. The clinical significance of these data was also indi­
cated, with 38% of children in the control group suffering moderate to 
severe levels of depressive symptomatology by the two-year follow-up, 
compared with 12% in the prevention condition (see Figure 8.3; in this 
comparison, moderate to severe depressive symptoms is defined as a score 
greater than 18 on the GDI).
A central aim of POP is to guide children toward more accurate causal 
attributions for the negative events in their lives. Ghildren at risk for de­
pression tend to exhibit depressogenic thinking styles, such as pessimism. 
They habitually respond with pessimistic attributions without determining 
their accuracy. Therefore, for these children, thinking more accurately is 
equated with thinking more optimistically. Results from this first trial did 
indeed demonstrate that children in POP developed significantly more op­
timistic explanatory styles compared with their control peers over the 
follow-up period (see Figure 8.4). Furthermore, mediational analyses in­
dicated that this positive change in explanatory style led to depressive 
symptom relief in the prevention group children.
This study demonstrated the two premises essential to our program of 
research. First, children can become more optimistic when equipped with 
a set of cognitive skills. Second, this chemge in explanatory style has pro­
phylactic effects against depression.
40
30
20
10
0
Percentage with GDI greater than 18
Pre Post 6 mth 12 mth 18 mth 24 mth
Prevention Control
Figure 8.3. The proportion of children experiencing moderate to severe 
levels of depressive symptoms.
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Higher scores represent greater optimism
Figure 8.4. Explanatory style by condition and time (numbers represent 
months).
Conclusions and Future Directions
In this chapter we have described the childhood depression risk factors of 
learned helplessness and explanatory style. We have outlined a learned 
optimism program designed to redress them. Narrowly defined, learned 
optimism is the process of reattribution; modifying one’s causal explana­
tions to fit reality. Typically, this entails adopting a more optimistic expla­
nation for negative events. More comprehensively formulated, learned op­
timism is a set of cognitive-behavioral skills that children can use to 
ameliorate the effects of pessimism and catastrophic thinking and to im­
prove social problem solving. At its core, the program equips children with 
greater flexibility and resiliency.
Our research platform continues to be one of dissemination and empir­
ical validation. To this end, in the last two years we have trained middle- 
school teachers as program providers. In addition, we have implemented 
research methodologies designed to answer some important questions 
about the mechanisms of change in POP. We believe that systematic ex­
amination of dissemination emd process issues will enable us to more ef­
fectively “inoculate” children against the epidemic of depression.
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